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REVIEWS
EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, by
John MacArthuir Maguire. Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1947.
Pp. xi, 251. $3.00 (paper bound).
Professor Maguire states, "This book is meant for people who are
having trouble, or who expect to have trouble in understanding the
application by judges of rules of evidence." He surmises that it will be
read by a few intelligent laymen, by some lawyers, but in the main by
law students.
Although such an estimate of reader interest may turn out to be
correct, this little book compressing the field of evidence into two hun-
dred and thirty-one small size pages deserves a wide reading public
among lawyers and teachers, as well as among law students. For in writ-
ing a book of this type for law students, the author has not only made a
major contribution in the field of legal educational literature, but he has
also produced a volume which can be read with delight (and profit) by
practitioners and teachers.
This work is a particularly important volume in the field of legal
education because it appears to be the first in which a law professor,
who is an outstanding authority, has had the courage to aid his students
by laying out in published form the structure of his course. In effec-
tively summarizing his class materials by pointing out the basic major
problems in the field, explaining and analyzing the fundamental work-
ing tool concepts in the field examining the interrelation of the various
parts of the field-in his own very readable style-with very few cita-
tions-Professor Maguire has produced a new tool in teaching. This
is not the usual type of textbook-one which purports to give the
student all the answers and rules; it is a book to make the students
aware of the fundamental sweep of the law of evidence and primarily
to make him understand the basic difficulties. It thus meets the recent
insistent demand foi such type of book as a basic tool in the teaching
of a course.1
The author's expectation that the book may be read profitably by
intelligent laymen is probably too optimistic, but it is undoubtedly of
great value to law students. In fact, it ought to be required reading
in every course in evidence in the absence of similar type of material
produced by the teacher himself for his own course. At the beginning
of the course, the student should read it through carefully. He probably
will not understand it all. But if he reads the pertinent parts as he
goes through his course and then re-reads it at the end of the course, he
should be able to grasp it with solid understanding. Unfortunately, as
yet, the book does not appear to be snfficiently widely known among
law students the country over.
1 See Max Rheinstein, "Education for Legal Craftsmanship," 30 Ia. L.
Rev. 408 (1945).
RFIEIWS
In introducing the student to the mysteries of the application of rules
of evidence by judges, the author has managed to discuss a large number
of intricate problems. Brief mention of some of these puzzles considered
will indicate why the book can be read with enjoyment by attorneys, as
well as with profit by students.
The treatment of the subject of impeachment of witnesses by self-
contradiction and rehabilitation of witnesses so impeached (pl3 . 54-70)
is typical of the interesting quality of the volume in oitlining the basic
nature of a subject and leading the reader through the maze of knotty
problems involved in that subject.
In considering the problem of introducing extra-judicial consistent
statements of a witness to rehabilitate the witness after he has been
impeached by introduction of an inconsistent statement, the author
analyzes the case of Crawford v. Nilon, 289 N.Y. 444, 46 N.E. (2d)
512, 514 (1943) and asks why the consistent statements were rejected
in that case. Should a consistent statement be considered hearsay if the
witness is present and can be cross examined as to such a statement?
Are such statements really excluded on account of technicdl arguments
concerning hearsay? Is not the basic reason the fear that unsavory
practices iii dealing with witnesses might result? If such statements
were admitted would attorneys as a result "hot box" witnesses, like
college fraternities dealing with prospective pledges just prior to the
pledging date? What effect would admission of such statements have
on the efficiency of the court in carrying the trial through on the
issues? If attorneys-officers of the court-are of such low order that
they must be restrained in dealing with witnesses by Xhe means of exclud-
ing consistent statements, will such an exclusionary rule have any real
effect in restraining or curbing unsavory practices? These and other
questions are raised and concisely dealt with by the author in his typical
good humor when dealing with evidence problems.
Following this subject (at pp. 64-69) is undoubtedly one of the best
printed concise explanations of the "somewhat obscure" rules governing
introduction of independent evidence of inconsistent statements to im-
peach a witness. In the leading case of Attorney-General v. Hitchcock,
I Exch. 91, 98 et seq. (1847) the Attorney-General charged Hitchcock
with having illegally used a cistern for making malt, called one Spooner
as a witness, and obtained from Spooner testimony of illegal user. Ap-
parently Spooner was asked, "Have you not said that the officers of
the Crown offered you £20 to say the cistern was used?" Answer:
"I never did." Thereafter the court excluded an offer to prove that
Spooner had said to X that he was offered this bribe. Professor Ma-
guire's concise analysis of this case indicates clearly the problems in-
volved in this situation and the proper answers.
In one form or another the hearsay rule crops up throughout the
book. Perhaps one of the main values for the student is the indica-
tion of the importance of the hearsay idea in connection with other rules
of evidence. The exposition concerning the nature of hearsay and its
use as a working tool (pp. 11-23) is particularly helpful and readable.
The author also refers more than once to a connection between the
11,JAII LlhF QIJLIRTERLY
fundamental nations underlying the opinion rule and those underlying
the hearsay rule. For anyone confused by the artificial distinctions often
applied in connection with the hearsay rule, this volume will be an aid
to clarification of the problems involved. Thus, at page 151, it is pointed
out that to obtain admission of an extrajudicial statement, attorneys
sometimes successfully use a type of argument which would abolish the
hearsay rule if carried to a logical conclusion. The courts have often
accepted, as circumstantial evidence of the taking of action, proof of
expressions of determination or intention by the alleged actors to take
such action. As an illustration, the author cites the statement, "I went
to the movies last evening." That may well be admissible as evidence
of the belief of the decla rant at the time of speaking if the belief is
pertinent to some issue. But what is to stop this inference process?
In view of the suggested use of the above statement, the author poses
the problem of whether the judge could let in the statement on the basis
of the following reasoning. "He says he went to the movies; this is
some evidence that he believes he went there; the belief, depending upon
memory, is in turn some evidence of his having seen, heard, and felt
phenomena that convinced him he entered a movie house, sat down and
watched a performance; his perception of these phenomena is some
evidence of their occurrence and thus of his attendance at a moving
picture show." By use of similar, more extended chains of inferences,
it might be argued that any extrajudicial statement is admissible. Thus
the hearsay rule would cease to exist. Various possible solutions to this
problem are discussed.
Even if the problems and subject matter were "old stuff" to the
attorney, he would undoubtedly enjoy the book as a new treatment of
the subjects considered because of the interesting, clear-cut style-the
witty, yet wise and tolerant treatment of the author. The volume is a
breath of fresh air in the dark Calcutta-like hole of dry style in law
textbook writing.
All in all, the book is something new and different in the educational
field-a pioneering book to set a standard for other similar materials
which should be produced by other teachers, a textbook for law stu-
dent's profit, and a book for attorneys to enjoy.
ROBERT MEISENHOLDER.*
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
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ton: lioiighton, Mifflin Co., 1947. Pp. 361. $3.50.
THE NINE YOUNG MEN, by Wesley McCune. New York:
Harper & Bros., 1947. Pp. 293. $3.50.
Efforts to make the mysteries of the law clear to the man in the
street apparently will never cease. The authors of these two books
believe-or at least their publishers profess to believe-that these
studies of the present-day Supreme Comt can 'be read and mderstood
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